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METHODOLOGICAL INDIVIDUALISM FOR THE 
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY? The Neoliberal acculTuraTioN aNd 
remoralisaTioN of The Poor iN aoTearoa New ZealaNd
Eileen Oak
absTracT
This article examines the enduring influence of the principle of methodologi-
cal individualism in New Zealand society, following thirty years of neoliberal 
economic policies. It contextualises this examination within the global finan-
cial crisis of 2008-2011 and the debate as to whether this crisis signalled the 
start of a post-neoliberal epoch. Drawing upon welfare reforms over the past 
sixteen years, it argues that, within New Zealand, neoliberalism has become 
more entrenched than ever, manifest in the persistent remoralisation of those 
defined as poor and through the ways in which the principle of methodological 
individualism is frequently invoked as a solution to the challenges presented 
by neoliberal welfare entrenchment. Though it acknowledges neoliberalism as 
a contested political project, this article supports the view that continuities in 
successive National and Labour government welfare reforms in housing, child 
welfare, and social security have embedded a neoliberal culture of disparage-
ment for those deemed unsuitable or unable to participate in the market. 
Keywords: Aotearoa New Zealand, neoliberalism, methodological individual-
ism, poverty, underclass discourse, culture, governance, welfare.
iNTroducTioN: The NeoliberalisaTioN of New ZealaNd
Over the past thirty years, Western society has witnessed a ‘roller-coaster ride’ 
in the fortunes of neoliberalism as both an economic and socio-political phe-
nomenon. Though its global progress has always been contested and uneven 
(Hall 2011; Larner 2000), the success of neoliberalism was cemented by the 
popularity of Reaganism in the US, Thatcherism in the UK, Kohlerism in West 
Germany, and Lange in New Zealand in the 1980s, which revived the fortunes 
of classical economics as the dominant economic paradigm adopted by many 
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Western governments. This continued into the 1990s and 2000s as many left-of 
centre governments adopted neoliberal policies, often under the guise of the 
‘Third Way’ political philosophy (Duncan 2007; Roper 2008). The influence of 
neoliberalism then extended into wider society as neoliberal ideas began to 
permeate large areas of the ‘social’ (Parton 1998).
The term ‘neoliberalisation’ can be understood as a cultural process in which 
individuals, organisations, and institutions are educated in, and encouraged 
to adopt, the principle of methodological individualism, the value of market 
primacy, the need for the privatisation of state services, and the introduction 
of managerialism into organisations, in order to inculcate neoliberal values of 
self-determination and self-reliance in the maintenance of welfare and well-
being. The principle of methodological individualism requires defining be-
cause it is a central tenet of neoliberalism and evolved from the classic liberal 
tradition of the eighteenth century (Udehn 2002).
Methodological individualism is the idea that institutions are only really the 
product of the activities and interactions of individuals based on legal or con-
tractual obligations and conducted in a methodical way (Oak 2009, 34). Lars 
Udehn (2002) distinguishes between different types of methodological indi-
vidualism (MI) on the basis of strength. Weak versions of MI acknowledge the 
capacity of social structures or institutions to constrain human agency. Strong 
versions of MI suggest that all social phenomena can be explained only in 
terms of individual action: society is simply constituted by the rational actions 
and interactions of purposeful human agents engaged in business transac-
tions. This principle of methodological individualism underpins neoliberal 
ideas about laissez-faire economics and non-state intervention in the economy. 
Hence, individuals are encouraged to take responsibility for their own welfare 
through working, as neoliberals believe that they will be more economically 
successful and independent unencumbered by state interference. Strong forms 
of MI have been a consistent feature of both Labour and National welfare poli-
cies in New Zealand over the past thirty years (Roper 2008).
The extent to which neoliberal market-driven social reforms have infiltrated 
into culture at a broad-based level is at issue. Because neoliberalism is such a 
dynamic and contested term, it is difficult to define ‘neoliberal culture’ beyond 
a set of general values and principles. Moreover, like neoliberalism, ‘culture’ 
is also a contested term, though however it is conceptualised, it is increas-
ingly acknowledged that it is a fluid, dynamic, and nuanced process (Bennett 
2007; Nairn et al. 2012). Several writers (Bennett 2007; Williams 1958) examine 
culture as a series of social and historical processes in order to identify the 
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power dynamics within and between societies. Raymond Williams considers 
how concepts of culture changed in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries due to the impact of industrialisation in Europe, which resulted in a 
shift in public perceptions of social, political, and economic institutions, and 
culture became increasingly linked with a sense of national identity. Thus, by 
the end of the nineteenth century, the term ‘culture’ came to mean ‘a whole way 
of life, material, intellectual and spiritual’ (Williams 1983, 13). In suggesting that 
culture is a way of life, Williams identifies the fact that it involves a process 
of shared meaning between members of a group or society, and he uses the 
term ‘ordinary’ to refer to culture as a resource of such shared meaning which 
all society’s members can access and develop. He is at pains to emphasise this 
dimension of culture in order to challenge bourgeois or middle-class attempts 
to appropriate culture and redefine it in their own class terms, as reflected in 
concepts like ‘high culture’ as differentiated from ‘mass culture’ (Williams 1989).
A more contemporary exploration of culture is rendered by Tony Bennett, who 
tries to explain how culture is produced and maintained through what he 
terms the ‘assemblage of materially heterogeneous elements’ (2007, 610). He 
defines culture as ‘all kinds of bits and pieces, that are fashioned into durable 
networks whose interactions produce culture as specific kinds of public or-
ganisation of people and things as readily perceptible’ (613). Adopting Bennett’s 
definition of culture as an assemblage of things is useful because it provides a 
conceptual framework to examine how neoliberal ideology and discourses are 
used to underpin and legitimate various durable networks which re-educate 
people into accepting a new role with the state. Rather than being the main 
provider of welfare, the state is now a partner with citizens in making provi-
sion for their welfare needs. In this respect, it is argued that neoliberalism has 
had a considerable influence on New Zealand society as neoliberal values and 
principles of methodological individualism, self-reliance, and self-responsi-
bility began to permeate large sections of people’s lives. From the encroach-
ment into the family manifest in neoliberal governments’ exhortations not to 
depend upon the state but to make provision for family welfare by working 
in paid sectors, to increased incentives to insure against risk, to the spread of 
managerialism in the sites of health, education, welfare, and social services, it 
can be seen that neoliberalism has taken hold (Roper 2008). Moreover, over 
the past thirty years the principle of methodological individualism has consist-
ently been invoked by successive neoliberal governments to encourage New 
Zealanders to take responsibility for dealing with the poverty and inequality 
generated by neoliberal welfare reforms.
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Neoliberalism aNd PoverTy iN New ZealaNd
Max Rashbrooke (2014) asserts that there is a direct link between the neolib-
eral restructuring of New Zealand welfare in the social policies of Labour and 
National governments in the 1980s and 1990s and increased income disparities. 
Beginning with what is termed the ‘New Zealand Experiment’ in 1984, manifest 
in the deregulation of the economy, the elimination of tariffs and trade restric-
tions, the sale of state assets, the weakening of the collective bargaining power 
of the trade unions, and the privatisation of many welfare services, he contends 
that these reforms coincided with increased income disparities between rich 
and poor New Zealanders: ‘The strong correlation between the structural re-
forms and this “great divergence” bears careful examination. For some econo-
mists there is a “prima facie” case for connecting the reforms with widening 
income inequality’ (Rashbrooke 2014, 29). He notes that the gap between rich 
and poor has widened faster in New Zealand than in any developed country 
since measures of income disparity were taken in the 1980s. The country’s top 
1% of earners own 16% of the nation’s wealth, with the bottom 50% of low wage 
earners owning just 5%. In addition, 75% of the lowest-income households 
have at least $20,000 worth of debt. Rashbrooke (2013) provides empirical 
evidence against neoliberal arguments for social mobility, illustrating the fact 
that 45% of New Zealanders living in poverty are still there some seven years 
later. He highlights the ways in which income disparities are linked to poverty 
in New Zealand, by defining poor people as those living on less than 60% of 
the average household income. He estimates that 790,000 New Zealanders 
were living in poverty in 2013 (Rashbrooke 2013).
Though poverty is only one measure of hardship, it is significant because there 
is an abundance of evidence linking poverty to the increased likelihood of 
experiencing material hardship and negative outcomes in the form of reduced 
life chances. For example, poor New Zealanders are twice as likely to experi-
ence hospital admissions for infectious diseases than non-poor (Baker et al. 
2012); they are more likely to experience fuel poverty (Lawson et al. 2015), and 
are more likely to experience severe material hardship. This is defined by Perry 
(2009) as the inability to afford to participate in social events (like weddings, 
birthday parties, or funerals) due to a lack of resources; the inability to afford 
a good bed, to heat two main rooms adequately, to purchase fresh fruit and 
vegetables regularly, to replace worn-out shoes, to purchase sufficient meat for 
the household’s needs, to afford suitable clothes for important social occasions, 
to maintain doctors’ appointments, or to purchase prescriptions. Using these 
measures it is estimated that 11% of New Zealanders experienced severe hard-
ship in 2008 (Perry 2009).
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Given the serious impact poverty has on well-being, Rashbrooke’s (2014) as-
sertion about the correlation between neoliberal restructuring and income 
disparities requires serious examination. In order to conduct such an examina-
tion, it is necessary to ascertain to what extent neoliberal welfare restructuring 
is occurring.
a PosT-Neoliberal era?
Notwithstanding the pervasive nature of neoliberalism, it seems its ‘roller-
coaster’ ride reached a climax in the global economic crisis of 2008-2011, re-
sulting in a ‘tidal wave’ of socio-political unrest that has not been witnessed 
since the Wall Street Crash of 1929 and the Great Depression of 1932–1935 
(Harman 2009). This crisis has compelled purportedly right-of-centre govern-
ments to use vast sums of public money to bail out large financial institutions 
and major banks. In Latin America, the global financial crisis has culminated 
in the election of a series of socialist governments and the rejection of the 
austerity programmes of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank. 
All these developments have seriously undermined the hegemony of neolib-
eralism, with some arguing that this crisis has resulted in a post-neoliberal era 
(Ceceña 2009; Blond 2010; Riggirozzi, 2010).
In contrast, John Clarke (2010) is sceptical that a post-neoliberal epoch has 
occurred, and he uses the term ‘statism’ to refer to the agency of nation states 
to respond individually to international fluctuations in the global economy. He 
stresses that the responses to the global financial crisis have been nation-state 
specific and have been articulated in terms of national industries, national 
job losses, threats to national economic prosperity via foreign competition, 
and buyouts of home-grown industries (Clarke 2010). Within New Zealand, 
the response to this crisis has been articulated in terms of welfare cuts and 
retrenchment. Louise Humpage (2014) draws upon Peck and Ticknell’s (2002) 
model of three phases of neoliberalism: roll-back, roll-out, and roll-over. The 
roll-back phase is where policies are introduced to curtail the Keynesian wel-
fare state. The roll-out of the second stage of neoliberal reforms takes the form 
of the entrenchment of neoliberal policies, while phase three is the roll-over 
or capitulation of civil society through the acculturation of the electorate to 
neoliberal restructuring. This acculturation process is legitimated by what 
Humpage refers to as the ‘there is no alternative’ discourse through which neo-
liberal economic and welfare policies are portrayed as the only viable option 
for New Zealanders.
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Neoliberal acculTuraTioN via The creaTioN of welfare subjec-
TiviTies
David Sam and John Berry refer to acculturation as ‘the process of cultural and 
psychological change that results following meeting between cultures’ (2010, 
421). Though this term usually refers to meetings between nations and ethnic 
groups, it can also be applied to all different types of cultures. When I refer to 
neoliberal acculturation, I am suggesting that thirty years of neoliberal reforms 
following thirty-five years of social democratic welfare have resulted in social 
and psychological changes in public attitudes to welfare. This acculturation 
process is manifest in the increasing acceptance and adoption of the principle 
of methodological individualism and the inculcation of the values of self-
reliance and self-responsibility for welfare.
Bennett’s (2007) concept of culture as assemblage enables an analysis of the 
ways in which neoliberalism assembles ideas, social processes, networks, and 
actors to generate a programme to facilitate the roll-out of neoliberal wel-
fare reforms. Neoliberalism seeks to ‘appropriate the ordinary’ to structure the 
‘public organisation of people and things’ around the interests of capital. In 
particular, New Zealand governments and corporate interests have successfully 
generated public perceptions that welfare organisation under managerialism 
is a rational, efficient, and purely technical affair. From the presentation of 
managerialism as technical (as opposed to discursive) knowledge used to gen-
erate more efficient services, to the shift in the status of New Zealanders from 
citizens with welfare rights to welfare subjects with obligations, neoliberalism 
has secured a strong degree of consensus for these ideas and values.
However, achieving consensus is not a straightforward process but rather re-
quires the ability to accommodate and incorporate competing ideologies and 
political projects. Wendy Larner, for example, challenges what she terms the 
‘programmatic coherence of neoliberalism’ to suggest that even at its height, 
manifest in the structural adjustment programmes that constituted the New 
Zealand Experiment, neoliberalism was never a well-structured, clearly ar-
ticulated, and unified political project (2000, 12). This was due to the fact that 
different articulations of neoliberalism within New Zealand politics were pro-
duced as a result of alliances, conflicts, and compromises between neoliberal 
and conservative elements, as well as traditional social democratic parties 
shifting to the right of centre in their policy development in order to get elect-
ed (see Kelsey 1999; Lunt et al. 2008).
Nonetheless, Larner (2000) demonstrates that neoliberal governments have 
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been successful in making such accommodations to oppositional groups by re-
placing control by the state with control by market governance. She illustrates 
the ways in which neoliberal governance forms have been able to reconstruct 
new welfare subjects:
The subjectivities of New Zealanders have become more clearly 
aligned with the individualistic assumptions that underpin neolib-
eralism and . . . economic identities have come to be posited as the 
new basis for political life, usurping those associated with social citi-
zenship. (Larner 2000, 19).
Moreover, neoliberal governance mechanisms have assembled new forms 
of partnership arrangements to reinforce the construction of these welfare 
subjects. Community development activists, who had spent twenty-five years 
pursuing social justice projects, found their political initiatives neutered by the 
professionalisation of their roles into strategic partnerships. This neutering of 
political opposition has been achieved in two stages. First, local community 
activists – historically, mainly working in the voluntary sector and opposed 
to neoliberal cutbacks and welfare retrenchment – were compelled into the 
roles of ‘Strategic Brokers’ or ‘Partnership Managers’ responsible for develop-
ing community resources, requiring formal training and qualifications. Second, 
their ad hoc networks became formalised into strategic partnerships through 
the requirement to work with central and local government agencies, which 
were introduced from the late 1990s by Labour-led governments.
In constructing these new welfare subjects, neoliberal culture assembles two 
oppositional discourses: one discourse is that of the ‘good’ self-reliant welfare 
subject who recognises their social obligations by aspiring towards market 
participation; and the other discourse constitutes the unemployed as ‘feck-
less’ individuals steeped in the culture of ‘welfare dependency’ (Roper 2008), 
part of the group commonly defined as poor. Here ‘culture’ is represented as a 
series of behavioural traits, and these traits are regarded as inappropriate. In 
this context, the concept of habitus (Bourdieu 1977) – which can be defined 
as habits, norms of behaviour, attitudes, values and expectations which re-
sult in self-identity, and are acquired by individuals through membership of 
a particular social group – is inverted when applied to those defined as the 
underclass, and is used to amplify what they are perceived to lack in terms of 
the ‘right’ types of cultural capital. It is the behaviour traits of the underclass 
that are seen, by neoliberal politicians, to be the cause of their problems. They 
have relied so long on state benefits that they are unwilling and/or unable to 
work and so have become dependent on welfare. Reference to the ‘right’ types 
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of cultural capital reflects middle-class assumptions as to which qualities are 
required for social inclusion and represents neoliberalism’s considerable suc-
cess in appropriating certain concepts of culture.
Though it appears that neoliberal governance has had considerable success in 
the creation of welfare subjects, progress has been uneven because, like neo-
liberal hegemony, neoliberal acculturation is an uneven process. Surveys that 
have attempted to measure the extent and depth of market-oriented attitudes 
provide evidence of a significant, though not all-encompassing, shift towards 
neoliberal values over the past thirty years. For instance, research by Nairn 
et al. (2012) identified the contradictory and nuanced ways young people re-
sponded to or inculcated the neoliberal principle of methodological individu-
alism. These young people were all born in the mid-1980s, so the researchers 
referred to them as ‘children of Rogernomics.’ Though many of these research 
respondents subscribed to the neoliberal discourses underpinning the notion 
of successful transition, defined as leaving school with university entrance 
qualifications leading to a degree, which in turn leads to a well-paid job, their 
adoption of neoliberal culture was nuanced and depended upon other factors 
such as ethnicity and spirituality. For example, Māori respondents’ adoption of 
the individualised, successful transition discourse was interspersed with indig-
enous values and motives about enhancing mana to the whānau. Spirituality 
was also a key factor in the fluid way neoliberal values were produced in these 
contexts, particularly for Samoan respondents who interpreted this concept 
in terms of religious affiliation to church, community, and family, leading the 
researchers to conclude:
In each case spirituality, however interpreted, worked as a resource 
for thinking about and acting on, ways of belonging or not belong-
ing with communities, families and peer relationships. . . . In offer-
ing these perspectives, these young people provide an interesting 
contrast to the model neoliberal subject who acts as autonomous 
individual located in the materiality of the consumer world. (Nairn 
et al. 2012, 79).
Similarly, Humpage’s work (2010; 2014) examines the impact of thirty years 
of neoliberal reforms in New Zealand and considers how these have affected 
public attitudes to social citizenship. She suggests that the concept of ‘social 
citizenship’ embodies all the rights characteristic of the Keynesian welfare state, 
such as government responsibility for and intervention in supply-side eco-
nomics to generate full employment; universal, state-funded health care, social 
security, and education (including tertiary education); and state pensions and 
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national insurance schemes. She observes that there has been a hardening of 
public attitudes towards the unemployed, though this trend is far weaker in 
relation to issues of state-funded healthcare and education, while attitudes 
towards neoliberal economic policies are mixed. With regard to public atti-
tudes towards the unemployed, these are somewhat nuanced. For example, 
in her research over 80% of respondents supported work-related conditions 
for benefit recipients, but advocated training and education as incentives, not 
coercion and benefit sanctions. Most (88%) were opposed to Work-First con-
ditions or benefit sanctions being imposed upon chronically sick or disabled 
benefit recipients, whom research participants considered ‘the most deserving 
groups in society’ (Humpage 2010, 5). This research was extended over a four-
year period and drew on a vast array of data comparing public opinion trends 
in New Zealand, the UK, and Australia over the past thirty years. Humpage 
concludes that ‘neoliberalism has had a significant, but incomplete and shifting, 
impact on public attitudes towards the unemployed, health care, education, 
pensions, tax and redistribution in New Zealand’ (2014, 4).
Such empirical research highlights the complex ways the public perceives and 
responds to welfare policies. Nonetheless, one persistent feature seems to be 
the popularity of a neoliberal discourse which maintains that the public has 
clear ideas as to which groups constitute the deserving and undeserving poor. 
This remoralisation is particularly evident in the areas of housing, child welfare, 
and social security.
remoralisaTioN of The Poor
The neoliberalisation of the housing system has led to two forms of social ex-
clusion of the poor: firstly, through the ways housing policy mitigates against 
affordable housing and, secondly, through the ways increasing numbers of 
homeless people are excluded from public space (Laurenson and Collins 2006). 
Thorns (2006) examines the neoliberalisation of housing policy in the 1990s 
and observes that this was part of the wider neoliberalisation of the welfare 
state. The 1992 Housing Restructuring Act abolished low interest loans to lo-
cal councils for housing benefits to assist low-income households as well as 
the home ownership savings scheme. It resulted in the marketisation of the 
housing system through the raising of rents for state housing on parity with 
rents in the private sector. Thus, poverty was amplified as the introduction of 
market rents led to a 50% increase in state housing rents between 1990 and 
1999, exceeding both annual inflation rates and the rises in the Accommoda-
tion Supplement.
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The exclusion of the poor from affordable housing is mirrored in the exclu-
sion of homeless people from public space. Such exclusion is legitimated by 
neoliberal discourses on homelessness which pathologise the homeless for 
their inability to find accommodation. Thorns (1989) identifies the ways in 
which homelessness is socially constructed as a personal failure of thrift and 
industry. This construction casts homelessness as a private trouble owing to 
personal failure, which in turn prompts consideration of an ethical dilemma: 
are homeless people deserving of assistance? This discourse invokes the older 
Victorian notion of the deserving/undeserving poor (Lewis 2006). Other writ-
ers highlight the increasing social control aspect of the state’s response to the 
homeless through their exclusion from public space, and note the punitive 
dimensions of this approach: ‘Such regulations can be said to follow the same 
prejudicial “logic” that underpinned vagrancy laws, namely, that homelessness, 
and poverty more generally, is the result of personal failing or choice’ (Lau-
renson and Collins 2006, 185–86). Though they acknowledge that such bylaws 
coexist with contradictory council policies on homelessness projects aimed at 
finding homeless people permanent accommodation and access to social and 
welfare services, they highlight an increased use of bylaws over the past fifteen 
years, which has often led to the displacement of homeless people from city 
centres, ironically where many of the welfare services they require are located.
Along with the exclusion of the poor from mainstream society is their invis-
ibility, which is another aspect of neoliberal poverty management. A consistent 
feature of the National government’s response to the issue of child welfare 
over the past four years, from the processes of the green and white papers on 
vulnerable children to the Vulnerable Children’s Act receiving Royal Assent on 
1 July 2014, has been the government’s refusal to acknowledge the significance 
of child poverty in the creation of child vulnerability. The White paper ignored 
many of the 9,547 submissions to the Green Paper: Vulnerable Children (2011) 
which included repeated exhortations to address child poverty (cPaG 2011), 
and indeed the White Paper: Vulnerable Children (2012) redefined the term 
‘vulnerable children’ to refer only to those children subject to physical or sexual 
abuse, or family violence. In ignoring poverty and neglect, the White Paper 
referred to New Zealand’s 20,000-30,000 vulnerable children, not the 270,000 
living in poverty as suggested by the Children’s Commissioner (Children’s 
Commission 2012). In addition, through the introduction of the Crime and 
Disorder (Amendment No. 3) Act (2011), the government reinforced the neo-
liberal emphasis on individual responsibility by introducing legislation making 
parents/carers and welfare professionals responsible for tackling child abuse.
The past sixteen years have witnessed a continuity in neoliberal welfare re-
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structuring as successive Labour and National governments have reformed 
the subjectivity of ‘New Zealanders’ from social democratic citizens with needs, 
entitlements, and rights (including universal welfare rights), to welfare subjects 
with responsibilities and targets of welfare in the form of Work-First social 
security applicants, thus usurping citizenship identities with economic ones 
(Duncan 2007; Lunt et al. 2008; Roper 2008). This reconstruction from citizens 
to welfare subjects began with the Labour-led coalition government of 1999, 
which introduced a series of Work-First measures between 2000 and 2004. 
Labour’s coalition policy programme was heavily influenced by UK Third Way 
politics, known to some as Labour’s version of neoliberalism (Duncan 2007; 
Kelsey 1999; Roper 2008). This form of Third Way had strong methodological 
individualist underpinnings in that it gave primacy to the market, supported 
free trade and fiscal austerity, and promoted supply-side policies, especially to 
do with employment. Although the Clark governments reversed some aspects 
of the neoliberal restructuring of the welfare state, key features of the neolib-
eral social policy reorganisation were maintained (Duncan 2007; Roper 2008.
The new underpinning principle of welfare has thus shifted from a social, pas-
sive welfare, which sought to address individual needs for protection from 
the vagaries of the global market, to an active welfare subject, one who must 
demonstrate employability or proactive willingness to move towards employ-
ability status (Lunt et al. 2008). Thus, from 2002 to 2006, the Labour-led gov-
ernment introduced a series of measures to ensure the consolidation of the 
active welfare recipient. These included reforms to the Widows and Domestic 
Purpose Benefit (dPb) in 2002 and the introduction of the ‘Jobs Jolt’ in 2003. 
The Widows and dPb reforms introduced a personal development and employ-
ment plan, while the Jobs Jolt introduced fifteen measures relating to Sickness 
and Invalid Benefit recipients’ work eligibility. The significance of the Work-
First emphasis was the extension of the work requirement to all beneficiaries 
regardless of ability or disability or long-term sickness.
Such reforms can be better understood by reference to the concepts of ‘hard’ 
and ‘soft’ Work-First regimes (Lodemel and Trickery 2001). Hard Work-First 
regimes can be characterised by the emphasis placed upon work-search be-
haviours, which are reinforced by sanctions for those who fail to secure work 
or who do not meet the obligations and requirements placed on social secu-
rity recipients. Soft Work-First regimes emphasise training, education, and 
skills to make the recipient more employable. Though sanctions do play a part, 
the emphasis is still on managing the unemployed. Though New Zealand has 
always had an expectation, since the Social Security Act of 1938, that benefi-
ciaries should seek employment, there was no individualised action plan like 
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the one underpinning the Work-First programme. These kinds of sanctions 
reappeared in 2007 under the auspices of social security legislation (Roper 
2008). Thus, since 2002 New Zealand has shifted from a soft Work-First to a 
hard Work-First regime. This provides further evidence of the durability of 
neoliberal socio-economics (Roper 2008).
National-led governments have continued Labour’s hard Work-First welfare 
programme. Between 2011 and 2013 the Key government introduced a series 
of social security measures and amendments to the 1964 Social Security Act, 
ostensibly aimed at getting people into work as soon as possible and at reduc-
ing welfare dependency, but containing a host of measures that had more to 
do with the management of the poor. The Social Security (New Work Tests, 
Incentives and Obligations) Act 2010 requires benefit recipients to look ac-
tively for jobs (requiring them to keep a diary of all job applications and job 
interviews attended) and to attend work preparation training administered by 
wiNZ. Similarly, the Social Security Youth Work Focus Amendment Act 2012 
again emphasised increasing the ‘employability’ of young people by replacing 
wages in the form of cash with credit cards and requiring them to work with 
contractors provided by the Ministry of Social Development. These measures 
were accompanied by two Social Security Amendment Acts of 2012 and 2013. 
Under the 2012 Social Security Amendment Act, recipients of the Young Par-
ent Payment are required to attend education and training programmes and 
undertake a parenting programme, while the 2013 Social Security Act requires 
benefit recipients to ensure that any children over three years old attend early 
childhood education for 15 hours per week and that any child is registered 
with a general practitioner. Failure to comply with any of these conditions can 
result in benefit sanction, which can mean a cut or even a loss of full benefit 
for up to six months.
All these measures are attempts to control what is regarded as the perceived 
deviant or criminal behaviour of the poor. The stereotyped notions of their 
demoralised behaviour entails assumptions that, unless such regulation is put 
in place, the poor will engage in drug or alcohol abuse, benefit fraud, or shift-
less behaviour and hence maintain their welfare dependency. Moreover, Donna 
Wynd (2013) argues that many of these measures sought to foster specific types 
of behaviour, such as being available for work preparation training (even if a 
beneficiary has attended the same seminar five times!), being compelled to 
take up ‘suitable’ employment, and being liable to have the benefit stopped if 
recipients have outstanding warrants for arrest for criminal activities or for 
testing positive for a controlled substance. Wynd argues that through these 
measures the National government adopted a classic neoliberal approach to 
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poverty in the form of an ‘unrelenting focus on work or paid employment’ 
(2013, 2). However, many of these conditions have little to do with making 
beneficiaries more employable but rather embody a particular set of cultural 
assumptions and constructions of those defined as poor regarding their behav-
iour and parenting capabilities. These are all attempts to regulate the perceived 
lack of moral ‘fibre’ of the poor, in this case benefit recipients. Such assump-
tions reflect the classic underclass discourse which constructs benefit recipi-
ents as feckless, shiftless, conniving, neglectful parents, with a predilection for 
crime and deviancy (Mooney 2006). Moreover, the individual pathologising of 
welfare recipients occurs in that their behaviour, not the structural inequalities 
and challenges they face, is seen as being to blame for their ‘un-employability’.
These legislative changes have resulted in increased material hardship. For in-
stance, Wynd’s (2013) research identifies that 7,708 unemployment beneficiaries 
had their benefit cancelled between May 2011 and January 2012; however, it 
was unclear how many of these were cancelled because they moved into work. 
19,471 Unemployment Benefit (UB) recipients received a Grade One sanction 
(of these 9,000 were parents with children), and 7,708 had their benefits can-
celled due to work failure (Grade Three sanction).1 There were 2,977 people on 
the Domestic Purposes Benefit (dPb) who were sanctioned for failure to meet 
work obligations, while 16,013 parents with children were sanctioned between 
October 2011 and November 2012.
The series of legislative measures introduced by the National government was 
based on the recommendations of the Welfare Working Group (wwG) (2010) 
which was tasked by the Ministry of Social Development to outline propos-
als for the reform of the social security system, with an objective of reduc-
ing 100,000 beneficiaries over the next ten years. The government endorsed 
all the key recommendations of the wwG, including those outside its remit. 
Within its report, neoliberal discourse is evident in the repeated reference to 
the ‘responsibilities’ and ‘social obligations’ of benefit claimants, and through 
a number of its key recommendations on parenting obligations, the provision 
of advice on managing household budgets, and support for at risk families 
– that is, families at risk of abuse, family violence or sexual abuse, not at risk 
from poverty or unemployment (cPaG 2011). The Report envisages that these 
programmes would render ‘wrap around’ social services for vulnerable families. 
In their response to the wwG Report (2010), O’Brien et al. (2010) criticised 
the governmental brief underpinning it for its narrow frame of reference, the 
adoption of a punitive approach to welfare, and its failure to consider the ad-
equacy of current benefit levels. They then summarised the key elements of a 
Keynesian social democratic welfare state: ‘Social security in New Zealand was 
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built on five planks: full employment, accessible education, affordable housing, 
and quality health care and adequate income. Social Security is only one part 
of that system’ (2010, 8). They also criticised the government’s individualised 
approach to unemployment and its failure to recognise how unemployment 
is linked to fluctuations in the economy.
The comparison between these two assessments of welfare is significant be-
cause it illustrates the two competing cultures: one social democratic and one 
neoliberal. Moreover, O’Brien et al. (2010) systematically deconstruct the neo-
liberal discourse on welfare in several ways. Firstly, they illustrate how the lan-
guage of welfare changed in New Zealand from ‘needs’ and ‘rights’, ‘participa-
tion’ and ‘community responsibility’, and ‘welfare as a means of ensuring basic 
survival’ indicative of the 1970s, to the 1980s and 1990s parlance of ‘sufficient 
assistance’ and ‘genuine need’, ‘responsibilities’ and ‘obligations’. Secondly, they 
observe how, since the 1980s, there has been a sustained attack on beneficiaries 
as ‘dependents’, and a focus on their perceived culture of ‘welfare-dependency’. 
The uNderclass discourse 
The culture of methodological individualism has strong echoes of the Victori-
an remoralisation of those defined as poor, particularly in the types of welfare 
subjectivities generated by recent legislation that makes a clear demarcation 
between the ‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’ poor. Such discourses have their 
origins in the English Charities Organisation Society formed in 1869 and in 
the reforming zeal of its leaders Helena Bosanquet and Octavia Hill. They were 
concerned by the fact that the 1834 Poor Law Amendment Act in England had 
created a dependency culture amongst the poor, and they sought to remoralise 
the poor into the middle-class values of self-sufficiency and the Victorian work 
ethic. Thus they sought to use the Charities Organisation Society’s system of 
poor relief to discriminate paupers from the deserving poor (Mooney 2006).
The modern version of this Victorian notion of deserving and undeserving 
poor has developed into a discourse of the problem of what is pejoratively 
termed the ‘underclass’. Though it is argued that the term has no empirical 
basis (Wynd 2013), it has a discursive basis within neoliberal ideology. In an 
economic context the term ‘underclass’ refers to members in the lowest stratum 
of society below the working class. It is similar to the Marxist term ‘lumpen-
proletariat’. Gunnar Myrdal (1963) is generally credited as the first person to 
use the term ‘underclass’. However, over the past three decades, it has been used 
in a pejorative sense by neoliberal politicians, journalists, and social scientists 
to refer to more than a person’s economic position. For instance, the American 
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academic and Charles Murray (1996) used the term ‘underclass’ to suggest 
that the poor are behaviourally deficient. Murray argues that the position of 
the underclass is constituted not by economic factors alone but also by the 
deviant behaviour of its members, as he makes clear from his definitions of 
the term: ‘There are many ways to identify the underclass. I will concentrate 
on three phenomena, that have turned out to be early warning signs in the 
United States: illegitimacy, violent crime, and drop-out from the labour-force’ 
(1996, 26).
Murray makes reference to the culture of the underclass when referring to its 
members’ reliance on welfare. In Murray’s analysis, ‘culture’ is being presented 
as a set of behavioural traits, and thus he argues that the underclass can be 
distinguished by a reliance on state benefits, the experience of lone parenting, 
a tendency to have children out of wedlock, homelessness, and engagement in 
criminal activity. In a similar vein, John Key has on several occasions adopted 
an underclass discourse when referring to a solution for poverty, such as in his 
State of the Nation speeches of 2007 and 2008. In 2011, when conceding that he 
had failed to keep his 2008 election promise to reduce the number of people 
in the underclass, he again utilised underclass discourse when referring to the 
government’s track record on addressing the problems of welfare dependency, 
drug addiction, and crime (Trevitt, 2011).
By conflating the term ‘underclass’ with terms such as ‘welfare dependency’, 
‘crime’, and ‘drug addiction’, Key mobilises support for neoliberal values. At 
the same time he reinforces Murray’s ideas about a culture of the poor, which 
suggests that they make a series of lifestyle choices. It is interesting to note 
how ‘culture’ is constructed in these two neoliberal discourses as sets of de-
sirable and undesirable behavioural traits. One discourse suggests that, in a 
free market, cultural capital (as utilised by the highly motivated, methodi-
cal, individual) can be energised as a source of wealth creation for all, and 
the other discourse suggests that the culture of the poor is anathema to this 
potential. These discourses work in tandem to divert attention from the mate-
rial inequalities generated by neoliberal policies. It is the persistence of this 
underclass discourse that is perhaps the most telling aspect of the durability 
of neoliberal ideas.
coNclusioN: Neoliberal reTreNchmeNT aNd remoralisaTioN
A key aspect of Bennett’s definition of culture is the way it can be reproduced 
in a series of networks to render the public organisation of target groups as 
readily perceptible to society’s members as a whole. In this respect, neoliberal 
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culture has been successful in several ways. It has been utilised to mobilise 
support for the neoliberal restructuring of the public sector on managerialist 
lines and socially to construct those who have been labelled as members of an 
underclass. The negative ways they have been portrayed are readily perceptible 
to most New Zealanders (Roper 2008; O’Brien et al. 2010). This negative repre-
sentation of the poor has been achieved by approaching the idea of culture on 
different levels: by inferring the difference between mainstream culture and a 
deviant sub-culture; by identifying culture as a series of negative behavioural 
traits; by inverting the concept of habitus to show what the underclass lacks in 
relation to the working New Zealand citizen; and by presenting members of 
the underclass in a dualism as the undesirable ‘other’. Of course, these attempts 
are often met with resistance, and such resistance is reflected in examples of 
public opposition to neoliberal welfare reforms in the form of the Alternative 
Working Group, Child Poverty Action Group, the groundswell of opposition 
to the lack of focus on poverty in the Vulnerable Children’s Act 2014, and the 
persistence in New Zealand of the idea of welfare rights as a basic human right 
(Humpage 2014). Nonetheless, none of these developments has done much to 
halt the ‘drip-feed’ effect of thirty years of neoliberal acculturation.
The global financial crisis thus did not mark the end of neoliberalism; if any-
thing neoliberalism has become more entrenched within New Zealand society. 
This argument is supported by reference to Humpage’s (2014) synopsis of the 
roll-back, roll-out, and roll-over phases of neoliberalism that occurred be-
tween 1984 and 2014, and by highlighting the continuities between successive 
Labour and National governments since 2000. Both parties whilst in govern-
ment have presided over the shift from a passive to an active welfare subject 
and the shift from a soft to a hard Work-First regime. Moreover, though Third 
Way advocates use the term ‘stakeholders’, and neoliberals ‘consumers’, the dif-
ference is one of emphasis rather than foundational ideology. Both political 
parties emphasise individual responsibility through market participation, both 
give primacy to the market and espouse the classic neoliberal principle of 
methodological individualism, and both endorse the remoralisation discourse. 
This latter trend is illustrated in the housing, social security, and child welfare 
legislation that they have introduced, which includes conditions that go way 
beyond the state’s remit in terms of addressing a specific issue like unemploy-
ment or child neglect, and seeks to manage the perceived behaviour of those 
concerned. Here again, Williams’s (1989) argument about the middle-class 
appropriation of culture is relevant because, in laying claim to identifying 
the ‘right’ types of cultural capital or in reference to the remoralisation of the 
poor, neoliberal discourses seek to reinforce a middle-class cultural hegemony 
throughout society, seeking to define and set parameters on what constitutes 
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‘acceptable’ behaviour.
It is recognised that neoliberalism within New Zealand has never been a co-
herent and monolithic political project (Humpage 2014 Larner 2000). For 
example, punitive and exclusionary policies on vagrancy and excluding the 
homeless from public spaces coexist with council projects on finding them 
accommodation and welfare and social services (Laurenson and Collins 2006). 
Punitive Work-First programmes sit alongside new working tax credit systems 
for low-income families and the National government’s retention of the Em-
ployment Relations Act 2000, which gives some (small) scope for collective 
bargaining, and there have been some slight increases in the minimum wage 
(Humpage 2014). Key’s brand of neoliberal culture combines a drive for global 
free trade (believed to generate a robust domestic economy) and an obsession 
with reducing welfare dependency, with social justice concerns such as projects 
for the homeless, the retention of the Employment Relations Act 2000, and the 
passage of the Gay Marriage Act 2013. However, the question remains as to 
whether all these factors nullify the material impact of neoliberal policies and 
fundamentally undermine support for neoliberal values. I would argue that 
they do not, and I refer to welfare retrenchment, the efforts to remoralise the 
poor, and the institutionalisation of poverty to illustrate how little has changed. 
There is nothing new about these discourses. Whether they are drawn from the 
classic liberalism of the nineteenth century or contemporary neoliberalism, 
such discourses are always underpinned by strong forms of methodological 
individualism which serve to legitimate the separation of the deserving and 
undeserving poor within welfare. They are invoked every time there is a socio-
economic crisis and a restructuring of welfare, be it in the 1880s, 1920s, 1990s, 
or during the global financial crisis of 2008-2011, and the scapegoat is always 
the same. The only variant is the new twenty-first-century parlance embodied 
in Third Way discourse and notions of hard welfare regimes. Nonetheless, it 
is the same methodological individualism underpinning this neoliberal ap-
proach, adapted for a new century to neoliberalise twenty-first-century New 
Zealanders.
NoTes
1 A Grade One sanction is where the client has had an obligation-failure in the 
first twelve months and has not recomplied within five working days of the 
obligation-failure. This results in 50% of the main benefit being suspended. A 
Grade Two sanction is where the client has had two obligation-failures in the 
past twelve months and has not recomplied within five working days, which can 
result in 50% of the main benefit being suspended. A Grade Three sanction is 
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where the client has had three obligation-failures in the past twelve months and 
has not recomplied within five working days, and this can result in 50% of the 
main benefit being cancelled (cPaG 2014).
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